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CLARIFICATION OF HOMICIDE LAW IN CALIFORNIA
FROM RECENT DECISIONS
BY

WILLIAM W.

COSHOW

In 1936, James Pike, writing on homicide in California, 1 expressed himself in substance that although
the law involving homicide should be of maximum clarity, it was in fact in great confusion.
Since that time,
beginning with People v. Albertson 23 Cal 2/550 and cul-

minating in People v. Wells

33 Cal 2/330, the California

Supreme Court has handed down several decisions which
have done much to clarify the law on those aspects of
homicide which had created the most confusion.
This
article will attempt to relate certain chanzes and reconsiderations which have occured in the past five or
six years.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEGREES

OF MURDER

Commencing with People v. Holt 25 Cal 2/69 and
continuing through several subsequent cases the Court
established that for a homicide to be murder in the
first degree it must fit into one of three categories.

A -

Any killing committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate arson, robbery, rape, burglary, or mayFiem
is murder in the first degree.
Penal Code 189.
These
killings need not be intentional, in fact may be accidental, but by force of the statute are first degree
2
murder.
B .
.
.
all
murder which is perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait, torture . . . is murder in
the first degree." Penal Code 189.
This differs from the former categorv in that the kil"There must be an intent to
ling cannot be accidental.
inflict suffering, though not necessarily death, by
means of poison or torture which results in the death
8
Apparently to sustain
of the one poisoned or tortured."
degree on the basis
first
in
the
murder
of
conviction
a
1 - See James A. Pike "nhat Is Second Degree Murder in California?" 9 S. Cal. Law Rev.
/12. People v. Holt 25 Cal. 2/59 at 84 - 92.
2 - People v. Holt 25 Cal. 2/59 at 83 - 92.
People v. Lindley 26 Cal. 21780 at 791.
People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 182. People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 135-6.
3 - People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 182. People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 136.

the defendant
must be shown that
in
wait" it
of
"lying
The bare fact
lay in wait with the intent to kill.
that he lay in wait and then killed is not sufficient
unless the jury reasonably infers that the intent was
already formed. 4

C - The third and last category of first degree murder
is a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. The
intent to kill must be formed with deliberation and premeditation to constitute first degree- murder with the
lay definitions of deliberation and premediatation being
applied. 5
Murder is described in Section 187 of the Penal
Code as the " . . . unlawful killing of another human
being with malice aforethought."
Penal Code 189 describes murder in the first degree in the three catezories described above, and further states" . . . "all
other kinds of murder are of the second degree."
Consequently,
one category of second degree murder is an
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought without deliberation and premediatation.
This
is the natural interpretation of a combined reading of
the two statutes, and this interpretation is now sup6
ported by the decisions.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ONCE STANDARD THAT ARE NOW ERRONEOUS
With the new distinctions drawn between the degrees of murder has come a new attitude toward proper
jury instructions.
Instructions which had been used
repeatedly to juries for years are now considered erroneous and there have been several reversals on that
ground.
The trial courts had traditionally instructed
the juries as follows:
"There are certain kinds of murder which carry with them
conclusive evidence of premediatation . . . These cases
are of two classes . . . First - by means of poison, lying
in wait, torture . . . here the means used is conclusive
evidence of premeditation; Second - one of the felonies
enumerated in the statute (P.C. 189) . . . here the occasion is made conclusive evidence of premeditation. When
4 - People v.
5 - People v.
People v.
6 - People v.
People v.

Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 890-L
Thomas 25 Cal 2/880 at 898. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 188.
Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 134. People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal. 2/52 at 60.
Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 903. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 21164 at 181 - 2
Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 131 - 2.

the case comes within either of these classes the test
the killing willful, deliberate and ore'Is
question:
meditated?' is answered by the statute itself . . . But
there is another and much larger class of cases included
in the definition of murder in the first degree . . . In
this class the legislature leaves the Jury to determine
from the evidence before them, the degree of the crime,
but prescribes for the governing of their deliberations
the same test which has been used by itself in determinThe
to wit:
ing the degree of the other two classes:
7
to kill."
deliberate and preconceived intent
The effect of this is to state that the Jury
a case of a premediated
in
should apply the same test
killing as it applies in a means or occasion killing.
To say that
This instruction is now considered error.
the same test applies to the first two categories also
The quoted instrucapplies to the third is incorrect.
the rationalization
to fit
evolved from an attempt
tion
means (poison,
the
of
the common-law interpretation
for
etc.) and occasion (five felonies) classes of murder
the
determines
itself
The statute
the statute.
into
thereby
two categories,
the first
murder in
degree of
Jurysuperfluous.
of premeditation
making consideration
confused by instructions
men are laymen and are often
As
minds.
trained
legally
which are worded by and for
states:
court
the present
"Attempts to explain the statute to the jury in terms of
non-existent 'conclusive presumptions' tend more to confuse than to enlighten a jury unfamiliar with the inaccurate practice of stating rules of substantive law in
8
terms of rules of evidence."
A second instruction which has been declared to
in
given to juries
often
the instruction
is
be erroneous
the dismurder and clarify
to define
an attempt
in
inThe usual
murder.
two degrees of
the
in
tinction
struction formerly included the following:
. . . unless the evidence proves the existence in the
to take life.
mind of' the slayer of the specific intent
If such specific intent exists at the time of such unlawthe offense committed would of course be
ful killing
degree." 9
murder of the first
7 - People v.
210 - 1.
8 - People v.
9 - People v.
People v.

Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 135. People v. Bernard 28 Cal. 2/207 at
People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal. 2/52 at 59.
Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 136.
Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 898. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 178.
Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 131.

This is error because specific intent is an element of voluntary manslaughter and murder of the second
degree as well as murder of the first degree.
Voluntary
manslaughter is an intentional killing with sufficient
provocation
existing
to remove the element of
malice
aforethought,
which is
of
course necessary
in
murder of
either degree.
Penal Code 187.
Murder of the second
degree is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought
which is
not
deliberate
and premeditated.
Therefore to
instruct
the
jury
that
if
they find
specific
intent
they must find murder in the first degree is prejudici10
erroneous.
ally
Generally these instructions would also contain
another statement:
but still
if you entertain a reasonable doubt whether the said killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated, then in such case you cannot find the defendant
guilty of murder in the first
degree."
The present
Court approves this
instruction,
but
the Court does not consider it to be corrective of the
above error.
The two instructions together are conflicting,
contradictory,
and confusing.
They treat
"specific
intent"
and willful,
deliberate
and premeditated
as if
they are synonomous.
This is
not
the case and- since it
is
not,
then the second instruction
does not
cure the
ill
of
the first.
Therefore
these
instructions,
once
11
error.
reversible
now constitute
stock,
Section
1105 of
the Penal Code reads as follows:
"Upon a trial
for murder, the commission of the homicide
by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mnitigation, or that justify
or excuse it,
devolves upon him, unless the proof on the part
of the
prosecuting tends to show that the crime committed only
amounts to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justifiable or excusable."
It
was customary for
the trial
courts
to quote
this
code section
to the jury.
This is now considered
error
for
two reasons.
The statute
distinguishes
between murder, manslaughter, justifiable and excuseable
homicide and not between murder in the first degree and
second degree.
In addition such an instruction can be
10 -

People v.

Thomas 25 Cal.

2/880 at 898.

People v. Bender 27 Cal.

People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 131 - 2.
11 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 901.

2/164 at 178.

misconstrued by the jury as indicating that the defendant must prove the mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence; whereas the true burden
placed on the defendant is merely to raise a reasonable
doubt.
By reading the statute verbatim to the jury, the
trial courts placed the burden of interpreting
the
statute upon the jury.
Statutory interpretation is not a
function of the jury but rather a duty of the court.
The Court now treats Section 1105 as a rule of
procedure to prevent the trial court from erroneously
giving a directed verdict in favor of the defendant
and has indicated that even with explicit explanations
as to the effect of the statute, it would be better
left unread. 12 This position is taken because the burden of proof in fact remains with the prosecution to
establish the crime and its degree.
A reading of the
statute with even a proper explanation, would be confusing to the laymen on the jury, because a proper
explanation conflicts with the wording of the statute.
The Court has held that, although the jury may reasonably infer that murder has been committed under the
circumstances described in the statute (Penal Code
1105) where the prosecution has not offered evidence
reasonably proving, or from which a reasonable inference may be drawn, establishing deliberation and premeditation, then the degree of murder is that of the
second and not of the first. 13 This is because the
statute states murder without specifying the degree
and where such ambiguity exists in a statute it will
be interpreted in the light most favorable to the
defendant.

the

Another instructibn which attempted to apply
common law to the statutes was one which stated:
"There need be . . . no appreciable space of time between
the intention to kill and the act of killing . . . a man
may do a thing deliberately from a moment's reflection
as well as pondering over the subject for a month or
year."
And a man, " . . . can premeditate, that is think
before doing the act the moment he conceives the purpose,

12 - People v. Albertson 23 Cal. 2/550 at 586 - 7 (concurring opinion). People v.
Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 895 - 6. People v. Lindley 25 Cal. 2/780 at 793 - 4.
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 132 - 4. People v. Cornett 33 Cal. 2/33
at

42 -

45.

13 - People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2-164 at 178 - 181.

as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or
preparation. " 14
This is error, the Court says, because it would
eliminate virtually the only distinction between first
and second degree murder.
As we have already seen (excepting of course the "means" and "occasion" categories)
first degree murder is willful, deliberate and premeditated, whereas second degree murder is with malice aforethought but is not deliberate and premeditated.
If deliberation and premeditation can occur in a "flick of
an eyelash," how can there ever be a case of second degree murder?
The statute has provided for two degrees
of murder, and since the logical distinction between the
two rests on deliberation and premeditation, this sole
distinction should not be destroyed by giving connotations to deliberation and premeditation which are contradictory to the ordinary meaning of the two terms. The
Court has laid down the rule that deliberatio-n and premeditation are to be given the definitions as expressed
in Webster's International Dictionary and as such presented to the jury.
Then it is for the jury to apply
the terms thus defined to the facts presented in the
case and therefrom determine the class and degree of
the homicide. 15
These stock instructions, which are now disapproved, are not all of the instructions attempting to
distinguish the classes and degrees of homicide which
are now considered error.
These are probably the most
important and are typical of instructions which would
be held to be objectionable.
To generalize it could
'be stated that instructions must be clearly stated in
lay terms; they must be completely consistent with one
another; and they must distinguish the classes and degrees of unlawful, intentional homicide as have been
set forth herein.
HARMLESS

tion

ERROR

16

The Constitution of California (Article VL, Sect4J) states:
"No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial
granted, in

14 - People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 - at 134. People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at
892 - 3. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 182. People v. Bernard 28 Cal.
2/207 at 212 - 3. People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal. 2/52 at 59 - 60. People v. Cornett 33 Cal. 2/33 at 40 -

15 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal.
People v. Vallentine 28
People v. Honneycutt 29
16 - For a discussion of an
v. Kolez 23 Cal. 2/670.

Rev. 628 - 34.

1.

2/880at900. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164at 182-6.
Cal. 2/121at 134- 5. People v. Bernard 28 Cal. 2/207 at 211.
Cal.2/52 at 60- L People v. Cornett 33Cal. 2/33at 41- 2.
instruction disapproved but not held eroneous see People
People v. Lindley 26 Cal. 2/780 at 794 co. 36 Cal. Law

any case, on the grounds of misdirection of the jury . . .
unless . . . the court shall be of the opinion that the
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. "
Under this
section
of
the Constitution
the Court
has found in some cases that, while the instructions
were erroneous, they did not under the facts of the
case operate
to materially
prejudice
the defendant
and
therefore are not reversible error.
There are two
types of cases under consideration herein controlled
by this
application
of
the Constitution
by the Court.
The first group are the cases where the occasion (five
felonies) or the means (poison, etc.) determines the
degree of
the crime.
In
these
cases
the trial
court
has instructed
the jury
that
the
occasion
or the means
carries with it a "conclusive presumption" of deliberation and premediatation.
This is error as we have
already seen.
However, since the statute determines
by its own authority the degree of the murder, and the
jury could have come to no other conclusion
as to the
degree or class of homicide had proper instructions
been given, there is no miscarriage of justice and the
conviction will not be set aside. 17
However, if the same instruction
is
given in
a
case where a first degree murder verdict is dependent
upon finding of deliberation and premeditation, the
error would no longer be harmless.
The statement in
the instruction that the "same test" is applied to a
willful, deliberated and premeditated killing is applied to an occasion or means killing is prejudicial
because of the
confusion
created
in
the
minds of
the
jury.
The second group are those cases wherein the defendant was convicted of first degree murder on the
basis of the third category; i.e. a willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing.
In
these
cases the relevant
error
consists
of the erroneous
instructions
relating
to the degree and class
of
homicide and provocation.
The Court has found that
though the errors
would normally be reversible,
in
some cases
they are not
prejudicial
because the particular
facts
of the case show
that
the jury
acting
as reasonable
men could have come
17 - People v. Bernard 28 Cal. 2/207 at 214.
People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal.
2/52 at 62. People v. Peterson 29 Cal. 2/69 at 78 - 9. People v.

Sanchez 30 Cal. 2/560 at 570.

to no other conclusion had the instructions been
rect. 18 The latest cases indicate that the trend
reverse unless the evidence supporting a finding
liberation and premeditation is unusually strong.
WHAT

coris to
of de19

IS PROVOCATION

Generally speaking, under the facts of most homicide cases, where the elements of malice aforethought,
deliberation, and premeditation control, provocation is
considered by the jury in determining those necessary
elements.
Sufficient provocation can remove the.element of malice aforethought thus reducing the crime to
voluntary manslaughter since malice aforethought is a
necessary part of murder of either degree.
But if the
provocation is not sufficient to preclude malice aforethought, it might show lack of deliberation and premedi
tation, reducing the crime to murder in the second degree.
Prior to People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121,
there were two conflicting lines of cases in California
concerning provocation.
One line held that:
" . . . neither provocation by words only, however oppobrious, nor contemptuous gestures without an assault upon
the person, nor any tresspass upon land or goods are of
themselves sufficient to reduce the offense of an intentional homicide with a deadly weapon from murder to mansl augh te r. " 20
The other line of cases stated that provocation
need not be of a particular type, but rather when it is committed under the influence of passion caused by an insult provocation sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable man . . ." 21
The conflict between the two lines of cases is
apparent.
In the latter group, any provocation which
would excite a reasonable man into a "heat of passion"
is sufficient to reduce the class or degree of the
homocide.
The other line requires more than mere
words, etc., that is, an actual as.sault or something
similar.
Neither line of cases contained a reference
18 - People v. Hilton 29 Cal2/217 at 222-3. People v. Tuthill3lCal. 2/92at 102-3.
19 - Compare People v. Hilton 29 Cal. 2/217 with People v. Cornett 33 Cal. 2/33.
20 - People v. Turley 50 Cal. 469 at 471. People v. Bruggy 93 Cal 476 at 481.
People v. Manzo 9 Cal. 2/594 at 599. People v. French 12 Cal. 2/720 at 744.
People v. Chutuk 18 Cal. App. 768 at 771. People v. Jackson 78 Cal. App. 442
at 448.
21 - Pebple v. Hurtado 63 Cal. 288 at 292. People v. Logan 175 Cal. 45.
People v. Golsh 63 Cal. App. 609 at 614. People v. Davis 92 Cal. App. 192 at 198.

to the other, and in People v. Vallentine the Court felt
the need for making a decision in favor of one or the
The cases supother and selected the more liberal view.
porting the stricter rule were based upon the common law
as embodied in the Crime and Punishments Act of 1850:
"In cases of voluntary manslaughter there must be a serious
and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing.
The Penal Code of 1872 carried no such limitation
the Code Commissioner's notes included:
"No words of reproach, however grievous, are sufficient provocation to reduce an intentional homicide from murder to
manslaughter. "
The Court held that in spite of the Commissioner's notes,
the deletion from the code itself of the express limitation of the Crime and Punishments Act should be interpreted as an intent on the part of the legislature to
The Court is not
remove the preexisting qualification.
to
the
statute when
concepts
bound to apply common law
the former.
of
a
codification
merely
the latter is not
which, when
statute,
Here there was an omission from the
considered in relation to the prior statute, would apConsepear to be a modification of the common law.
quently it is now established that provocation may be
anything which would excite an "ordinarily reasonable
22
man" to a "heat of passion."
though

OBJECTIVE OR

SUBJECTIVE

The reader has probably noted the customary legal
phrase "ordinarily reasonable man" in the preceeding
The common law was fairly well settled as
paragraph.
favoring the objective view when considering provocation.
The mere fact that the defendant was in fact aroused to
of passion was no defense unless an average man
a heat
of normal self control could have been aroused by the
In the discussion of provocation in
same provocation.
People v. Vallentine supra at 136-144, the Court repeatedly used expressions indicating an adherence to the
in
issue
was not
The point
man standard.
reasonable
however, and later cases do not follow a truly objective
In People v. Wells 33 Cal. 2/330 at 345, the
approach.
Court held that evidence of a state of mind in the defendant which would cause an abnormal reaction was not
admissible as pertaining to self defense for there the
However, the
reasonable man standard must apply.
22 - People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 136 -

44.

evidence was admissible as a fact to be considered by
the jury in determining whether malice aforethought and
In People v.
premeditation were in fact present.
held
otherwise on
Court
the
Danielly, 33 Cal. 2/362,
The Court
situation.
what appears to be a similar fact
Danielly
in
the
because
cases
distinguishes the two
case the proffered evidence of high nervous tension and
a psychoneurotic personality was not offered as affecting the elements of malice aforethought, etc., and
there was no indication that the crime was committed
the holding
The Court affirmed
of passion.
in
a heat
in
People
v.
Wells that evidence of the extraordinary
of
mind of the defendant is admissible in deterstate
mining malice aforethought, deliberation and premeditation.
To that extent at least California has dropped
the reasonable man standard and adopted the subjective
view.
the comit
can be seen that
From the foregoing
mon law concept of homicide is no longer the law in
Few, if any, of the old views remain.
California.
Criticism may be levelled at the Court from some quarters on the grounds that the decisions are judicial
However, it might be more accurate to
legislation.
the judithese
decisions
as merely repealing
consider
cial legislation of the earlier courts that first
attached the common law concepts to the statutes. Certainly the confusion which was so troublesome to Mr.
James Pike is to a great extent alleviated, and regardless of approval or disapproval, the fact remains
changed.
homicide law is
that
the California

